Who is isoroku yamamoto in world war 2

Birth Date:. Death Location:. Bougainville, Solomon Islands, New Guinea. Death Date:. Themes 20th Century. Russo-Japanese War. In the s, Japan acquiesced to Western arms limitation agreements but increased its aggression toward China.

Building upon its earlier annexation of Korea, Japan pressured Manchuria and northern China until they succumbed. Even before the financial crisis, most military personnel opposed Western-style parliamentary government, and budget limitations on military expenditures, and felt Western lifestyles were an affront to traditional Japanese values. In January , the London Naval Conference met to negotiate a disarmament treaty, with Yamamoto attending as a military adviser.

Japan opposed the terms set in Washington a ratio of five battleships or carriers each for the USN and the RN to every three ships allowed for the IJN and demanded it be raised to , a ratio that would grant it security but not threaten the US or UK. US Secretary of State Henry Stimson was eventually persuaded that this new ratio should be implemented for destroyers and cruisers with submarine ratios being equal for the three powers.

In the case of large ships, the ratio remained. Japanese military leaders quickly escalated their attacks on civilian politicians during the s. On the night of September 18, , Japanese army officers alleged that Chinese soldiers had blown up a small section of the Japanese railway in southern Manchuria. The Japanese army stationed in Manchuria used this accusation to quickly take all of Manchuria.

The civilian politicians were helpless in the face of support for the action in Manchuria supported by the Tokyo high command. Yamamoto, now a rear admiral, could not ignore these events. But, in his new position, he was not actively commanding any naval forces. Yamamoto developed, a decade before the West, an air fleet concept, based on establishing an aerial force capable of operating from land bases against naval targets, that could be placed on carriers if needed.

In , Yamamoto was appointed commander of the First Carrier Division, overseeing two carriers and several battleships.

His fellow IJN officer—just like their Western counterparts—still considered the battleship the primary naval weapon. Undaunted, Yamamoto demanded that six carriers must be employed in order to achieve a decisive tactical effect.

Preparing his forces for war but not hoping for one, despite threats, Yamamoto stuck to his opinions that war against the economically powerful US would be suicide for Japan. In , Yamamoto was appointed vice admiral and was an adviser in another naval conference in London. Recognizing that more discussions were fruitless, Yamamoto left England to tour Europe but refused to meet with Hitler and disapproved of a possible Japanese pact with the dictator.

Still, he kept his opinions to himself, and leading naval commanders believed they controlled Yamamoto. Another promotion occurred in August , when Yamamoto was appointed head of the recently established permanent Combined Fleet.

As the Pacific campaign began, the Combined Fleet became synonymous with the IJN because of its large numbers of battleships, aircraft carriers, and aerial forces. In November , he was promoted to admiral. Allied actions included an embargo on oil and metal exports, closing the Panama Canal to Japanese vessels and freezing assets, but the sanctions caused Japanese military leaders to plan an escape from dependency on the West through the capture of resource-rich European colonies in Southeast Asia.

Japanese leaders now felt that a war with the US, perceived as the main obstacle to Imperial ambitions, was inevitable. Overtaking the Southeast Asian oil reserves became a crucial factor in shaping Japanese strategy and a first step in the upcoming war. The two bodies entrusted with shaping Japanese naval strategy—the IJN General Staff and the Combined Fleet—agreed that the oil reserves must be taken quickly, but were divided regarding the best strategy.

The book, which was published four years before the inaugural issue of Education About Asia, offers a balanced examination of highly readable stories about the war by Japanese and Korean subjects of Imperial Japan , which will appeal to students.

Michael A. Daniel A. Bergerud also includes a short but compelling description of the war in China, which is often overlooked in history classes. All four of these articles appeared in the winter issue 17, no. The two articles appeared in the spring issue 11, no. Proponents of this strategy assumed Japanese forces could completely dominate the region before US forces could effectively intervene, and if the Americans moved toward Southeast Asia, the IJN would destroy them as it did the Russians at Tsushima.

Although the damage was relatively slight, Yamamoto was shocked, regarding it as a mortifying personal defeat. Writes biographer Potter, noting how impulsive the admiral suddenly became: "There can be no doubt however that his normally clear judgment was warped by the Doolittle raid. From May , , the world's first major carrier engagement took place in the Coral Sea.

Entirely fought by aircraft, it was the first sea battle in history in which no warship of either side ever saw an enemy craft. Tactically, the battle was a Japanese victory, for they had sunk the carrier Lexington and two smaller warships. Yet Japan lost the carrier Shoho , saw severe damage to the carrier Shokaku , and experienced the loss of most of the Zuikaku's planes.

The Japanese commander, Vice Admiral Inouye Shigeyoshi, deprived of most of his striking power in aircraft, withdrew. His failure to pursue the damaged Yorktown drew Yamamoto's ire, though Inouye had little choice. Strategically, the Coral Sea marked a U. Furthermore, Yamamoto was served notice that despite U. Seeking retribution for the Doolittle raid, Yamamoto decided to draw out what was left of the U.

Pacific Fleet in a decisive battle. The capture of Midway Island, a coral atoll six miles in diameter and a U. Furthermore, so Yamamoto believed, the strike would draw out the fullest strength of the U. Pacific Fleet. He would establish a lethal ambush, one that would destroy the carriers that had escaped him at Pearl Harbor. Once Midway was seized, Hawaii would be invaded, forcing the U.

Conversely, Yamamoto believed that if Japan did not soon engage in a decisive sea battle, its defeat was simply a matter of time. In a sense, Midway was his last chance. Yamamoto assembled the largest fleet in the history of Japanese naval warfare—some ships, among them 11 battleships, 8 carriers, 22 cruisers, 65 destroyers, and 21 submarines. Also involved were some planes and , naval personnel.

On the surface, Yamamoto's strategy was extremely sophisticated, perhaps too much so. He divided his fleet into widely separated groups. A northern force, including two carriers, would capture Kiska and Attu, islands at the western end of the Aleutians.

This strike would not only divert attention from the main target, Midway, it would keep American forces from using the islands as stepping stones to Japan. He planned to withdraw Japanese forces from the islands before the grueling winter. The bombing of Dutch Harbor would cause even further diversion. An advance force of Japanese submarines, patrolling west of Hawaii, would warn of any U. Twenty-four hours after the Aleutian strike, Admiral Nagumo's striking force of four large carriers would hit Midway from the northwest, followed the next day by Vice Admiral Kondo Nobutake's second fleet of two battleships, a small aircraft carrier, half a dozen heavy cruisers, and an invasion convoy.

As the main strength of the American fleet lay in Hawaiian or Australian waters so the Japanese believed , the strike on Midway would be a complete surprise. Once Midway was captured, the remnants of the U. But by then the Japanese would have the advantage of position as well as at least a advantage in carriers and four to five times the number of screening vessels.

At that point, Yamamoto himself would lead the combined fleet's main force, a powerful unit of seven battleships that included the two largest in the world then or since: his flagship Yamato and her sister ship, the Musashi. While he would be shutting the jaws of a gigantic trap, the northern force would come from the Aleutians to cut off the U.

Notes Layton:. His intricate battle choreography also required that his opponents move according to predicted positions; one false step or foreknowledge of the plan could throw the entire operation into disarray. In the battle, which took place from June 4 to 6, , Yamamoto operated under many disadvantages. Thanks to American cryptographers, the Japanese sailed into a trap.

Some Japanese ships had even mentioned their destination by name, and on May 20 a lengthy order of Yamamoto himself was intercepted. By the last week of May, the United States knew the date, place, and time of operation, as well as the composition of the Japanese forces. Yamamoto's submarines were ordered to report on the presence of American carriers, but they arrived on station 25 minutes too late to do so.

Yamamoto's operations officer had information pointing to the presence of a powerful U. By maintaining radio silence on his flagship, Yamamoto was unable to give instructions when needed. Not a single senior admiral had been fully briefed; all were drawn into combat on the shortest of notice. Nagumo failed to order an immediate attack once he learned of U. In the ensuing battle, no surface ships sighted each other or exchanged gunfire.

The devastating exchanges were carried out entirely by aircraft at long ranges. Three American carriers unexpectedly appeared, the Enterprise, Hornet, and Yorktown —the last ship fresh from hasty repairs. Within ten minutes, they sank three Japanese carriers— Kaga, Akagi, and Soryu — that comprised close to half of Japan's entire carrier tonnage.

The remaining Japanese carrier Hiryu successfully sunk the Yorktown, but later in the day it was hit by the Enterprise. A particularly crucial turning point took place when Nagumo, having learned that his initial air strike did not succeed in critically damaging Midway, decided to use his reserve planes in a second strike.

While his carrier crews were in the act of changing from torpedoes to bombs, his force found itself suddenly exposed to the carrier-based planes of the U.

Yamamoto himself took no part in the battle until it was too late. Therefore, I was with the fleet watching the sky two entire days. It was nothing but luck that I did not see any airplanes coming.

Anonymous says: 13 Jan PM like it. Bill says: 16 Feb AM yamamoto understood carrier airpower, he qualified as a pilot in his 50's he also understood that if japan went to war with the u. Yamamoto says: 24 Feb PM in class we were assined people during WW2 and i got yamamoto.

Anonymous says: 12 Apr PM wow this really helped me a lot, but wikipedia also has a lot. He recently completed a Biography on Isoruko Yamamoto and the only question I couldn't answer was "what became of Yamamoto's two sons and two daughters?

Their only hope was to knock us out of the fight quickly because if it turned into a grapple, they were screwed, even though we were fighting Germany as well. He may have been fond of us, but Japan was still his country and he would serve it.

But unlike many in Japan, he had been to this country and knew us. Many considered Americans weak, stupid, and cowardly. Shows what they knew. Also kind of ironic that he did not trust Germany but was the only non-German to be awarded the Knight's Cross. And then thinking of it also as a Greek tragedy. I think Admiral Yamamoto had a perfect ending, also, and didn't have to be around when the wheels finally fell off.

Whilst there were many fatal accidents in training, particularly in deck landings, the experience gained would pay dividends when it came to combat. It is said that Yamamoto once told his trainee pilots that to die in training was just as honourable as being killed in combat, but secretly kept a little black book in his tunic pocket which listed the names of all those aircrew that had been killed in training.

Yamamoto, but no one has said anything about the quote that he made after receiving the "Tora, Tora, Tora" message. This is a paraphrased quote, he said, "We have but awakened a sleeping giant and he will crush us" or words to that effect.

This statement could have ended his career if Gen. Tojo could have had his way. Yamamoto was a brilliant stratigist and a brave hero to the Japanese People of the time. May he rest in peace, May all those who fell in that conflict rest in peace. Their stories were just as thrilling as those told by my father pbwh. Japanese Missionary says: 16 Oct AM Killing Yamamoto was really a tragic necessity and was more of a turning point than Midway for in it Japan's Navy was decapitated.

He genuinely like America and Americans and deplored the idea of war. Americans found out after the war that he was really very pro-American and really bothered by Pearl Harbor. Had he survived the war he may not have been tried as a war criminal. He placed himself in peril and did what he asked his navy people to do. He went into a war zone and paid the price. He always believed he would die in the Pacific War. He left behind Reiko his wife and 4 children and the true love of his life, a geisha.

He was influenced by Christian Missionaries but never became a born again Christian himself. He is the greatest Admiral since Lord Nelson. The only one that could have succeded him with as much clout was RADM Tamon Yamaguchi, a brilliant strategist who took his own life after the Midway loss.

Yamamoto had high respect for the Amarican navy and airforce he knew better then to underestamated his opponet. And im sure he had the right intenstion just not enough men and equipment to succesfully carry out his plans.

Does anyone know is that was true? I love this site! Now I'm sure I'll do a good report! Merced High says: 2 Mar PM This was really great for my research paper and i really enjoyed this comment about him I first heard of Yamamoto when I was growing up in my village which is about a 20 minute drive to where his military transport had crashed.

Disturbing says: 19 Mar PM Yamamoto did what any true warrior would do, he fought and died for his country and his ideals. Anyone who holds that against him, is either a woman or a coward. They hit us, we hit them, that is war, do not shame the warriors who fight wars when most know nothing of the horror that they are. Names are shortened so that only those with historical backround can comprehend my thought process. Anonymous says: 5 Apr PM this is perfect for a search I am doing on yammamoto!

Thanks for the information. Anonymous says: 21 Apr PM Thank u all for these interesting comments. Bless Yamamoto's heart as well as those who were killed during the bombing at Pearl Harbor. Anonymous says: 22 Apr PM i have an old sword. I'm trying to find out how old it is. Anonymous says: 19 May AM did this for my report great info. It isn't often that a historian can present a two way detailed accounting of factual data.

If you chose Isoroku Yamamoto don't forget the Harvard, Smithsonian, Air and Space and separate military data bases on the subject material. I stumbled across letters that Isoroku wrote to Reiko where he wrote of the impending failure of Japan in the war. I forgot to mark the location of the material but It's under one of the aformention areas. Good Luck. Saad says: 9 Nov PM guys is this really something u wanna waste ur time on????? Anonymous says: 24 Nov AM this good im doing a power point.

Follis says: 24 Jan AM Being a amateur history buff of this era, I think your presentation of quick history facts of notable characters is excellent. I respect also your quick notes periodically reminding readers that much of historical events often produce conflict due to cited, or not, references of differing information not guaranteeing as actual fact in the telling. The young reader denigrating Nimitz not attacking head on was a chuckle. Too many western "gunman's walk" stories!

In addition his lack that Nimitz handed down the attack to Halsey authority to execute the mission following the breaking of the code. I suggest the young man never served in the military, which very quickly defines chain of command.